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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

AGENCY-AGENT'S LIABILI'tY FOR rNtGLIGENct.-The plaintiff, a dealer in
fruit, entered into an agreement with a railroad company in which the carrier agreed to transport fruit from Texas to Iowa, the railroad undertaking
to furnish the necessary refrigerator equipment for handling the shipments
and to put ice into the cars at certain points a'long the line The railroad
company procured the defendant to furnish the cars required for handling
plaintiff's shipments and to ice the cars as agreed between the plaintiff and
the railroad company. The defendant negligently loaded and iced the cars
containing a cargo of plaintiff's fruit, and as a result it was greatly damaged. Held, that the agent was guilty of misfeasance in the performance
of its contract with its principal, and for this it was liable directly to the
plaintiff. Emery & Co. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co. (Ia., 1921),
184 N. W. 750.
In passing upon the liability of the agent to third persons for negligence in the performance of duties devolving upon him by reason of his
employment, three theories of liability have been evolved. Following a
dictum of L~rd Holt in Lane v. Cotton, l Ld. Raym. 646, it has been held
that an agent is not liable to the third person for such negligence. M11rray
v. Usher, II7 N. Y. 572 (dictun~); Van A1itwerf? v. Linton, 35 N. Y. S. 318;
Delaney v. Rocher.eau & Co., 34 La. Ann. II23; Albro v. Jaquith, 4 Gray
(Mass.) 99; Feltits v. Swan, 62 Miss. 415; Henshaw v. Noble, 7 Oh. St. 226;
Drake v. Hagan, 108 T'erin. 265; Labadie v. Hawley, 61 Tex. 177· Other
authorities, following what seems to be the reasoning of the principal case,
adopt Lord Holt's dictuni, in which he said that the agent was liable for
misfeasance, and hold the agent liable when he has been negligent, on the
theory that the negligence converts what otherwise would have been a proper
performance of his duties into misfeasance. Bell v. Josselyn, 3 Gray (Mass.)
309; Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159; Southern Ry. Co. v. Rowe, 2 Ga. App.
·557; Ellis v. McNaughto1i, 76 Mich. 237; Greenberg v. Liimber Co., 90 Wis.
225. The weight of modern authority comes to a similar resu1t, but simply
inquires whether the agent has exercised that degree of care in his actions
which the law requires in the particular situation. Lough v. Joh1i Davis Co.,
30 Wash. 204; Haynes' Admrs. v. C., N. 0. & T. P. R. Co., 145 Ky. 209;
Schlosser v. G. N. R. Co., 20 N. D. 406; Jacks· v. Orth Lumber Co., 121
Minn. 46I; Risfog v. Ferris, 216 Ill. App. 252; Mayer v. Building Co., 104
Ala. 6n. The difficulties in determining whether the agent owes any duty
to third persons. When the agent has been put in control of property, or
given other powers ·which an independent actor would have, it should be
held that he owes a duty to third persons to use due care in what he does,
the same as any other individual. See l MICH. L. R:ev. 315, where a discussion of the principles involved will be found.
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.APP~A.I, AND ERROR-SE'f.l'LEM~NT oF ExcsPTIONS BY S'l.'IPur.ATION oF PAR-

Tms AFT$ EXPIRA'l'ION OF T:w~ LIMIT.-After the time set by court rule
for settling and filing a bill of exceptions, the appellant entered into a
stipulation with the appellee to extend the time for so doing. When the
record settled according to this agreement came before the court of error,
the appellee moved to strike out the bill of exceptions on the ground that
it had not been settled according to law. To have this point decided the
United States circuit court certified t~e following question to the Supreme
Court: "Is the bi'll of exceptions as above set forth settled and certified to
this court in contravention of law in that the term had expired before the
same was offered for settlement?" Held, that the exceptions could not be
considered, on the ground that jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the
courts of the United States by consent and the cour~ rule was for the acceleration of procedure and could not be waived by the parties. Exporters of
Manufacturers' Products Co. v. Butterwort!z,.Judson Co., U. S. Sup. Ct.
Adv. Op. No. 390 (April 10, 1922).
By this judgment the Supreme Court has reversed its former practice
of allowing delay in settling exceptions to be regulated by the parties. This
practice was recognized by implication as late as the case of J e1mings v.
Philadelphia Ry., 218 U. S. 255, in which relief was refus;d on1y because
no actual consent was shown, the court saying: "There must be express
consent, or consent which would equitably estop the opposite party from
denying that he consented." And in Waldron v. Waldro1i, 156 U. S. 36!,
a case identical with the principal case except that in it consent was given
during the term, it was held that consent would extend the time during
which a bill of exceptions could be settled. As the theory of the instant
case is that jurisdiction is given only by a strict compliance with the court
ru1e, and there is in the rule no express exception made for the case of
consent given during the term~ it can make no difference whether it is given
during the term or after the term has expired. The view which the Supreme
Court has swung over to is sustained by the great weight of authority
among the state courts. Crowe v. Charlesto1i, 62 W. Va. 91, 3 Ann. Cas.
IIIO; Perkfos v. Perkins, 173 Mich. 6go. There are, however, scattered
cases contrary to the proposition that strict compliance with the statutes
regulating the time for exceptions is necessary for the appellate court to
have jurisdiction of them. In New York, in the case of a delayed appeal,
it was held that th~ court of appeal has general power to review judgments
and that consent does not confer it but is merely a waiver of the right to
insist that the time has passed for bringing the appeal. Jacobs v. Morange,
l Daly (N. Y.), 523. In Morriso1i v. Craven, 120 N. C. 327, the court held
in regard to a delayed docketing of an appeal that "Where the counsel waive
the required diligence the court wi'll not exact it" -Sleek v. King, 3 Pa. St.
2u, which involved a delay in taking appeal, lays down the rule that if the
other party has appeared in court he cannot deny its jurisdiction. Coming
to cases more directly in point, in Perryman v. Burgster, 4 Port (Ala.) 505,
the transcript was considered, although it was not filed in time. See also
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State v. Williams, 64 Ind. 226. In Steven v. Neb. fas. Co., 29 Neb. 187,
the transcript was filed too late, but the court received it, saying: "The
district court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, and by
the defendant in error agreeing'to a continuance of the cause it conferred
upon that court jurisdiction of its person." In the last analysis, the question certified real1y resolves itself into an inquiry whether the time limit
for settling exceptions is for the benefit of the litigants alone or is designed
summarily to accelerate the course of' judicial proceedings without reference
to the convenience or wishes of the parties.
BILLS AND No~s-PA~ AS HOLDER IN DuE CoURsi>.-D made a note
payable to P in payment for certain shares of stock purchased from M.
The note was delivered to M, who thereafter sold it to P. In an action
on the note it was held, the fact that P was the payee did not preclude him
from being a holder in due course within the meaning of the Negotiable
Instruments Law. Bank v. Randell (Neb., 1!)22), 186 N. W. 70.
The holding in the instant case turns upon the construction to be placed
on the word "negotiate" as used in Section 30 of N. I. L., which provides:
"An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to
another in such. manner as to constitute the transferee the ho1der thereof.
If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order, it iS
negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery." Section 52 of the act, which defines holder in due course, prescribes that at the
time the instrument was "negotiated" to him he must have had no notice,
etc. The act also provides specifically that the payee is a holder (§ 191)
and that every holder is Prima facie a holder in due course (§ 59). It would
appear elementary that such construction should be given ambiguous t~rms
in the statute as will harmonize a11 the sections if possible. This can be accomplished by considering the first sentence of Section 30 as a complete definition of "negotiate" and the second sentence as illustrative of the usual
methods of negotiation, but not necessarily the sole methods. If the payee
is prima facie a holder in due course delivery to him by the maker or by
a third person intrusted by the maker with the instrument must be a negotiation to him within the meaning of sections 30 and 52. Before N. I. L.
it was well settled that the payee might be a holder in due course. Armstrong v. Am. Bank, 133 U. S. 443. The Nebraska court, however, had held
to the contrary. Camp v. Sturdevant, 16 Neb. 693. Some courts have held
that N. I. L. effected some change in this respect. Va11der Ploeg v. Vaii
Zimk, 135 Ia. 350, L. R. A. (n. s.) 490, note, 6 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 77; Bank v.
Walch, 76 Or. 272; Bank v. Edwards, 243 Mo. 553; Bowles v. Clark, 59 Wash.
- 336 L. R. A. (n. s.) 6I3, note. The Iowi and Oregon courts, however, have
denied that a payee may never be a holder in due course. Vander Ploeg v.
Van Zimk, supra; Simpso1i v. Bank, 94 Or. 147. The prevailing view is
that the statute has not changed the Law of Merchants. Bost01i Steel &
Ir01i Co. v. Steuer, I83 Mass. 140; Liberty Tmst Co-. v. Tilton, 217 Mass. 462,
L. R. A. 1915 B 144, note; Ex Parte Goldberg & Lewis, l9I Ala. 356, L. R. A.
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1915 F II57, note; Johnston v. Knipe, 26o Pa. 504 The situation under
the English Bills of Exchange Act is somewhat in doubt . The Divisional
Court in Herdman v. Wheeler [1902], l K. B. 361, held the payee not to be
a holder in due course, and the Court of Appeal in Lloyd's Bank v. Cooke
[1907], l K. B. 794, on almost identical facts reached the opposite conclusion basing their decision on the ground of estoppel. For the sake of uni- •
formity, if for no other reason, it is gratifying to see Nebraska adopt the
prevailing view under N. I. L. after being in the minority before the statute
was adopted. For an interesting discussion of uniformity under N. I. L.
see 59 U. OF PA. L. R.Ev. 471.
Bur,K SAI.ES ACT-TRANSFER ro CORPORATION ORGANIZED To TAKE OVER
AND CONTINUE THE BusINESS-APPI.ICABII.ITY OJ! STATUTE.-The officers of
an insolvent corporation organized a new corporation and transferred to
the new corporation, which was organized to take over and continue the
business, a substantial portion of the assets of the inslovent corporation,
without complying with the Bulk Sales Act. · Held, The transfer was within
the Bulk Sales Act and void. Keedy v. Stealing Electric Appliance Co.,
(Del. 1921), II5 Atl. 359.
·
But few cases have passed upon this phase of the question and they
furnish a diversity of conclusion. Upon the one hand is the holding in
Maskell v. Alexander, IOO Wash. 16 to the effect that the transfer of an entire business to a corporation organized to take over the business in consideration for stock in the new corporation is not a transfer within the Bulk
Sales Act. This decision was upon the ground that the sale was not for
cash, but for corporate stock, which was as available for the satisfaction
of the claims of the creditors after the transfer of the merchandise as the
merchandise was before. Wherefore the transaction did not violate the object of the 1aw, which it was said was to prevent a vendor ~rom selling his
stock of goods, pocketing the proceeds, and leaving his creditors remediless.
An inferior court in West Shore Fimiitttre Co. v. Murphy, 141 N. Y. Supp.
835, assumed, as did the principal case, that the transfer was within the.
act. Evidently these courts interpret the statute strictly, and construe the
act as an absolute prohibition against all sales not made in the ordinary
course of business, instead of a prohibition against only those transfers
which would work to the detriment of the creditors. This was the view
taken by the court in Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568. In that case A and
B having stocks of goods of equal value formed a partnership. As to
whether this was a transfer within the statute the court said "this realignment of interest of course did not work any impairment or diminution in
the value of the property that could be subjected to the payment of the
transferor's debts. But as the statute expressly condemns as void the sale
in bulk of any part of a stock of merchandise otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade, and in the regular and usua'l prosecution of the seller's
business" the transfer was held to be within the statute. The Bulk Sales
Act being in derogation of the common law and a restriction upon alien-
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ation, it would seem that the vVashington court has taken the better view
in construing the act to be a prohibition against only such transfers as
would work to the detriment of the creditor. Hence it would seem that a
transfer to a corporation in return for a stock should not be within the
statute for the debtor's property remains the same in value.
CoN'tRACTs-AGENCY-W!HEN HAs P.:. BROKER PERFoRMED so AS 'to BE EN'tI'tLED TO A CoMMISSION?-Plaintiff, a broker, sued for his commission under an agreement by the terms of which- he was to find a purchaser for
land on or before March I4, 19r5. On March roth, plaintiff mai1ed a notice
to defendant's intestate stating that he had procured a purchaser, and the
prospective purchaser sent to the vendor an unqualified acceptance. of his
offer. Other efforts were made by the broker and prospective purchaser to
notify defendant's intestate that the purchaser was ready, willing, and able
to buy on the terms specified. The facts indicated that failure to complete
the transaction was caused through the evasions of the vendor. Held, plaintiff was entitled to recover on the _ground that his letter mailed March roth
was notice to defendant's intestate and binding on him from the time it was
deposited in the mail. Lingquist v. Loble (Montana, 1922), 204 Pac. r70.
The court seems to indicate that the acceptance mailed by the broker
within the time specified was essential to his right of recovery, and numerous cases are cited hplding that an acceptance is binding from the time it
is mailed. It would seem, however, that this principle of contract is not
applicable to this case. The broker has very few of° the characteristics of
an ordinary agent. The agreement between broker and vendor is ordinarily
susceptible of either one of two interpretations. The broker may be in the
position 0£ one to whom the vendor has made an offer of a unilateral contract. The owner offers to pay a commission if the broker will perform
certain acts, i. e. -find a purchaser. The broker under this interpretation
does not agree that he will dind a purchaser. He may, however,. accept the
owner's offer and thus change it into a binding contract by the performance
of the act stipulated, MEcHru.t ON AGENCY, (Ed. 2), § 2429, or the agreement may be construed as a bilaterial contract, 20 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 788. If the
first interpretation is adopted, then finding a purchaser would seem to constitute a sufficient acceptance of the offer, notice being essential only as a
condition subsequent. See Brown v. Smith, 13r Mo. App. 59; Veale v. Green,
- 79 S. W. 73r; Cf. Bishop v. Eaton, 16r Mass. 4g6. However, if the contract
betwee'n the principal and broker be construed as bi1ateral, then the question arises has the broker sufficiently performed his undertaking so as to
be entitled to a commission and was notice as given in his letter of March
roth essential to his cause of action. Even under this theory, it would seem
- that the notice within the time specified was not material. The understanding was that he find a purchaser within the time who was ready, willing
and able to purchase. Where the understanding was to sell land within
a specified time, it was held that if the buyer was actually found within that
time although not reported 'to the principal unti1 afterward, the broker
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might, nevertheless, recover, the principal not having been prejudiced by
the delay, Schramn~ v. Wolff, (Texas, I9IO), I26 S. W. n85. But assuming
that under the bilateral theory notice of performance within the time specified is essential, it is well estabiished that when performance is prevented
by the acts of the principal, the cause of action is not defeated. Lundell v.
Schultz, I86 Ill.- App. 245, Wn.r.ISTON ON CoNTRAC'l'S, '§ 677.
CoNTRACTS-lLLEGAI.ITY OF "TYING Cr.AUSES" IN A LtAS:E OF MACHINERY
UNDER THE CLAYTON AC'l'.-Defendant, through its patents, contro1led a very
large portion of the business of supplying shoe machinery. Shoe machinery
was leased to shoe manufacturers upon conditions, some of which were (I)
that the machinery would be used only on shoes upon _which certain other
operations were performed on other machines of defendant; (2) that if
lessee failed to use exclusively certain kinds of machines made by defendant, lessor could cancel all leases; (3) that lessee should purchase all supplies from defendant; (4) that lessee should buy all additional machinery
of a certain class from defendant; (5) that royalty should be paid on a11
shoes operated upon by machines of competitors. In a suit by the United
States to restrain the defendant from making leases containing such restrictions, held, such restrictions were invalid under § 3 of the Clayton Act
which makes it unlawful for persons engaged in interstate commerce to
lease machinery, whether patented or unpatented, upon condition that the
lessee shall not use machinery of the competitors of the lessor, where the
effect of such lease may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to
create a monopo1y. United Shoe Machinery Corporation v. United States,
U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Op., No. n9, Oct Term, I92I.
In the absence of the statute, leases of machinery containing "tying
clauses" similar to those enumerated above have been upheld. United Shoe
Machinery Co. v. Brmiet [I909], A. C. 330; United States v. United Shoe
Machi11ery Co., 247 U. S. 32. But the court in the principal case decides
that such restrictions are prohibited by the Clayton :Act for, though "the·
clauses enjoined do not contain specific a~eements not to use the machinery
of a competitor of the lessor, the· practical effect of these drastic provisions
is to prevent such use." The defendants' chief defense was that the Act
is an unconstitutional limitation upon the rights secured to a patentee and is
therefore a taking away of property without due process. But the Supreme
Court has formerly held that a patent confers upon the patentee only the
exclusive rignt to make, use, and sell the invention and confers no privilege
to make contracts in themse1ves illegal. Motio1~ Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502; Standard Sa11itary Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 226
20.

u. s.

CRIMES-MENS ~-Defendant was indicted for having sold a derivative of opium in violation of the federal Narcotic Act of I9I4, 38 STAT. 785.
He demurred on the ground that the indictment failed to charge that he knew
the derivative to be such. Held, the statute did not make such knowledge
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an ingredient .of the offense and the allegation was not necessary. U1iited
States v. Balint, 42 Sup. Ct. 3or (March 27, 1922).
There is plentjr of authority in accord with the principal case. Ignorance of fact and, therefore, absence of evil intent are no defense if the
statute negatives that common law essential. Com. v. Mi.,;er, 207 Mass. I4I;
People v. Christiaii, I44 Mich. 247; R,e.,; v. Wheat, [I92I] 2 K B. n9, 20
MICH. L. fuv. Io8. The mere fact, however, that a statute does not contain the word "knowing'ly" or otherwise expressly require knowledge of
fact, does not definitely indicate that knowledge is not an element in the
crime. Such a requirement may be judicially implied. Faiilks v. People,
39 Mich. 200; Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. Div. I68. Consideration of extrinsic
circumstances is suggested in the latter case as a basis for interpretation of
the statute. As to the constitutionality of statutes which negative knowledge
as a necessary element in cdminal liability, see, DuE PROCESS AND PUNISHMENT, 20 MICH. L. fuv. 6r4
DEEDS-MENTAL CAPACITY MAY ExIS'l' THOUGH GRAN'l'OR HAS NOT CAPACITY 'l'O DO BUSINESS G:EN!lRALLY.-Grantor, a widow 93 years of age, made
a deed of land to her two granddaughters, fo11owing a family consultation
at which grantees were present. Plaintiff, grantor's guardian, sued in equity
to set deed aside, alleging that grantor was mentally incompetent to execute
a deed. Held, mental capacity may exist though grantor has not capacity
to do business generally. S1ttherland State Bank v. Fiergason (Iowa, I922),
I86 N. W. 200.
The degree of mental capacity required to uphold a deed varies with the
circumstances surrounding the conveyance, the requirement being that the
grantor understand the transaction in hand in ·al'l its consequences. Akers
v. Mead, I88 Mich. 277; Chamberlai1i v. Frank, 103 Neb. 442; Swa1i v. Steven's Estate, 2o6 Mich. 694. A distinction is to be noted between deeds in the
nature of gifts or testamentary conveyances, and those resulting from an
ordinary contract of sale. Hamlett v. McMilli1i (Mo., I92I), 223 S. W. Io69.
The doctrine of the instant case is probably limited to the former, as capacity
to do business generally is an ordinary test. in cases of the latter type. Porterfield v. K11ss, (Mo., I920), 226 S. W. 2I; Bordner v. Kelso, 293 Ill. I75·
EVIDENCE-SHOULD JUDGE OR JURY DETERMINE .WHETHER CONFESSION WAS
VoLUN'l'ARY?-Defendant was charged with murder, and on trial his confession was offered in evidence by the prosecution, and admitted by the court
for determination of the jury as to whether it was voluntary. Defendant
contended it was obtained by "third degree" methods, but the on'ly evidential
element raising any issue as to whether it was made freely and voluntarily
was defendant's denial of any knowledge of it, or of having made or signed
it. There was abundant evidence supporting the contention of the prosecution that it was made voluntarily by defendant. Held, assuming there was
created a tangible doubt as'to the voluntary character of the confession, it
was proper for the court to admit it and leave the question to the jury.
People v. Utter (Mich., I92I), I85 N. W. 830.
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The principal case follows the general rule laid down by previous cases
in Michigan, which is in accord with one line of authorities holding that
when the evidence is conflicting as to whether a confession was voluntarily
obtained, the question should be left to the jury under instructions to disregard the confession if upon all the evidence they believe it was involuntary. People v. Biossat, 2o6 Mich. 334; People v. Lipsczinska, 212 Mich.
484; Commo11wealth v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185; Williams v. State (Texas,
1920), 225 S. W. 177; Bomier v. State (Ga., 1!)21), 109 S. E. 291. Directly
opposed to that line of cases is the older and possibly more generally accepted doctrine that whether a confession was freely and voluntarily made
is a matter of admissibility of evidence to be determined by the court, which
doctrine is more in accord with the elementary principles defining the functions of judge and jury. WlGMORS ON EVIDENCE, § 86r. See Maclien v. State
(Ala., 1920), 85 So. 857; Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238; Ellis v. State; 65 Miss.
44; Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6; Stiner v. State, 78 Fla. 647; People v. Columb"s (Cal., 1920), 194 Pac. 288. Variations of the two rules are not infrequent as in Commonwealth v. Sherman, 234 Mass. 7, 'vhere it v.;as held
that the judge should first apply the rules of law to the confession in question, and after admitted by him, the jury should apply them again with power to reject the confession if not voluntary. To the same effect see Wilsou
v. U. S., 162 U. S. 613. In State v. Storms, n3 Ia. 385, it was held that
when the court is in doubt as to the voluntary character of the confession,
it should be left to the jury. In Bierton v. State, 107 Ala. lo8, the court held
that the jury should consider whether the confession was voluntary in passing on its weight, but once it was admitted by the coy.rt, the jury could not
wholly neglect it, it not being their duty to determine the question of admissibility. In such a case the jury will consider the same facts as the court
did, but with the purpose of determining credit rather than admissibility.
In State v. McDaniels (N. M., 1921), 196 Pac. 177, the court held that the
admission or rejection of a confession in the first instance is for the court,
but if after its admission a conflict of evidence arises as to its voluntary
character, the question of whether voluntary or not is for the jury. If the
facts surrounding the confession are uncontroverted, the court should rule
on its admissibility as a question of law, and under either of the two established rules the decision in the trial court is generally fina1, subject to reversal only if there is a clear error in the result.·
]URISDIC'tION-Tn5PASS 'tO R.EAr, PROPERTY-LOCAi", AC'tION.-The plaintiff brought an action of trespass in Idaho for injuries caused to his land
in Washington by acts of the defendant which occurred in the latter state.
Held, (Rice, J. dissenting) an action of trespass is a local action and can
be brought only in the state where the land lies. Taylor v. Sommers Bros.
Match Co., (Idaho, 1922) 204 Pac. 472.
The common law distinguished clearly between so-called transitory and
local actions,-requiring the latter to be brought in the venue where the
cause of action arose. As to the origin and development of the rule, see
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article, 27 W. VA. L. QUART. 301. In Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774), 1 Cowp.
16r, Lord Mansfield pointed out the lack of· substantial difference between
loca'l and transitory actions where "the whole that is prayed is a reparation
in damages, or satisfaction to be made by process against the person or his
effects, within the jurisdiction of the Court." He also referred to cases at
nisi prius involving injuries to foreign lands in which he, as judge, overruled the objection that the action being local, the English courts had no
jurisdiction, his ruling being based "upon this principle, namely, that the
reparation here was personal, and for damages, and that otherwise there
would be a failure of justice". The English courts, however, declined to
follow Lord Mansfie'ld's suggestion. In Doulson v. Matthews, (1792), 4
T. R. 503, where trespass was brought in England for injuries to land in
Canada, the court rendered the following opinion : "It is now too late for
us to enquire whether it were wise or politic to make a distinction between
transitory and local actions: it is sufficient for the courts that the law has
settled the distinction, and that an action quare clatesm1i fregit is local. We
may try actions here which are in their nature transitory, though arising
out of ' a transaction abroad, but not such as are in their nature loca'l."
Though the distinction between local and transitory actions was abolished
in England by the Court Rules adopted in 1873, 36 & 37 Victoria, 1873, c. 66,
Rules of Procedure, 28, it was subsequently held that trespass could not be
brought in England for injuries to land in a foreign jurisdiction. British
South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mozambiq11e [1893], A. C. 002. But see
the opinion of the court which was reversed: Companhia de Mozambique
v. British Soutl~ Africa. Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 4o6, 415. The language and logic
of the opinion in Doulso1i v. Matthews, supra, rendered in 1792, expresses
quite accurately the view. supported by the great majority of American
courts. The leading American case admits that the rule is technica1. (Marshall, J.) Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock 203, Fed. Cas. No. 84n. Though
the common law rule has been severely criticised even by the courts adopting it, only one court has absolutely rejected it. In Little v. Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co., 65 Minn. 48, the court, quoting Lord Mansfield's opinion with
approval, refuses to support the common law rule because "it is purely technical, wrong in principle, and in practice often resu'lts in a total denial of
justice." In some states it has been abolished by statute. Consolidated
Laws of New York, Real Property Law, § 536. The courts have grasped
at straws to remove cases from the rule. See cases referred to in Little v.
Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., supra, and the exceptions to the rule noted in the
opinion in the principal case. In Huiitingto1i v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, the
Supreme Court of the United States suggested that there was no inherent
reason for viewing trespass to real property as local, and that the rule was
based rather upon convention and custom than upon a fundamental want
of jurisdictional power. See also Peyton v. Desmond, 129 Fed. 1.
LANDLORD AND fiNAN'l'-DmA'l'IoN OF N:ew fiNANCY UPON WAIVF.R OF
Nonce ·ro Qu1'1'.-A controversy arising between the defendants and sub'lessees over an increase in rent, defendants gave notice to quit, which notice
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was cancelled by the defendants before its expiration upon agreement by
the sub-lessees to pay the increased rent. Held, that the notice to quit determined the sub-lease, and that waiver of the notice with an agreement to go
on at the increased rent created a new tenancy, thus constituting a breach
of defendants' covenant in the head-lease not to sub-let without leave, and
entitling plaintiffs, the head lessors, to reenter. Freeman v. Evans [1922],
l Ch. 36.
The principal case is controlled by a dictum in Blyth v. Dennett (1853),
13 C. B. 178, and the decision in Taylettr v. Wildin, L. R. 3 Ex. 303. The
decision there was that a notice to quit determines the tenancy upon the
expiration of the notice, and a waiver of the notice creates a new tenancy
taking effect upon the expiration of the old one.
It was there said:
"Whether the notice to quit is given by the landlord or the tenant, the
party to whom it is given is entitled to insist upon it, and it cannot be
withdrawn without the consent of both." But an invalid or insufficient
notice will not determine the tenancy. Holme v. Bmnskill (1878), 3 Q. B.
D. 495. The above stated doctrine is adopted as the English rule by Woon.
FALL, LANDLORD AND TENANT, p. 443 [Ed. 20], and FoA, LANDLORD AND TuNANT, p. 6o6 [Ed. 5]. Where the waiver comes after the date for the e.'Cpitation of the notice, it is evident the only effect can be the creation of a
new tenancy, but the Court of Appeal in Ireland declined to accept the doctrine that the only way to obviate the effect of a notice to quit was by the creation of a new tenancy, and in I11chiq11in v. Lyons, 20 L. R. Ir. 474, held that a
notice to quit which during its currency was abandoned by consent of the
parties did not per se put an end to a tenancy from year to year. This
view has much support in this country. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT,
§ 205. And many cases, probably the majority, in this country say that the
party giving the notice may waive it at his option before it has been acted
upon. Collins v. Caiity, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 415; Whitney v. Swett, 22 N. H.
ro; Sitpplee v. Timothy, 124 Pa. St. 375; Arcade Invest. Co. v. Gieriet, 99
Minn. 277. But see cot£tra, Wester1i U11io1i Tel. Co. v. Pemi. R. Co., 120
Fed. 362, in which the oistinction was made that a withdrawal of a notice
to quit was not, like a waiver of forfeiture, the act of one party, but
required the assent of both. In the principal case the court admit the decision
is technical, but justify it largely on the ground of redress to an injured third
party, the defendants having violated the same covenant under their previous
yearly tenancy. And in TayP.ntr v. Wildin the action was against a third party,
guarantor of the rent. There is an attempt to reconcile these cases with
Inclziqufo v. L';y,•ons, where the point was rai~ed by the lessor, by saying
that as between the parties and anyone else it may be quite right to consider
the old tenancy at an end, but not as between lessor and Jessee, since the
effect of such holding would be to turn present tenants into f~ture tenants
and destroy va1uable rights annexed to old tenancies. It would seem conducive to uncertainty and confusion to make the question depend upon
whether or not the point was raised by a third party. The better rule would
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seem to be that, where the notice is cancelled with the consent of both
parties before the date set for its expiration, a new tenancy is not necessarily created.
Ni;;<;r.IGEN~-R.Es !PSA loQUI'l'UR.-D laundry company was the lessee
of P's premises, which were damaged by an explosion of the laundry boiler.
D casualty company had inspected the boiler and issued a contract of insurance thereon to the laundry company. In an action against both it was held,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied to the laundry company, which was
in exclusive contro1 of the boiler, but did not apply to the casualty company because it was not in control. Kleinman v. Banner Laundry Company
et al. (Minn., 1921), 186 N. W~ 123.
The fact that the Minnesota court applied the doctrine of res. ipsa loquitiw to a boiler explosion is of no particular importance in view of the same
holding in an earlier case. Fay v. Davidso1i, 13 Minn. 523. For a collection
of cases indicating that the modern tendency is to the contrary, see note in
II3 Am. St R. g86. The interesting point is the distinction made between
the laundry company and the casualty company. The report does not indi.
cate upon what theory the casualty company was joined in the action. It
may have been for its own possible negligence in inspection, etc. Van Winkle v. American Steam Boiler Co., 52 N. J. L. 240. If such was the case, the
distinction appears to be sound. No inference of negligence can logically
be drawn against it from the mere fact that the boiler exploded while in
the exclusive control of another. Application of the doctrine would result
in a finding of negligence, but would not determine whose negligence it was.
However, the casualty company may have been joined as the real party in
interest by virtue of the contract of insurance, the terms of which do not
appear in the report. If this was the case, and the casualty company was
1iable for the negligence of the assured, the distinction which the court
makes would appear to be erroneous. Although the cases are replete with
declarations that the doctrine of r.es ipsa loquitur has no application unless
the defendant was in exclusive control, yet in all these cases, so far as has
been found, the negligence sought to be inferred was the negligence of the
defendant. McGillivray v. Grt. North. Ry. Co., 138 Minn. 278; Transportation Co. v. Downer, I I Wall. (U. S.) 129; Scott v. Dock Co., 3 Hurl. & C.
596. No case has been found in which the question has been square1y raised,
but it is submitted that the doctrine is applicable on principle against anyone
. who is liable for the negligence of another if it would be applicable against
that other.

SALES-R.IGH'l'S oF THIRD PAR'l'IES UNDER WARRAN'l'IES.-In a suit by the
vendee against the vendor for failure of vendor's warranty of title the court
said by way of dictum: "Warranties of chattels are available only between
the parties to the contract and not in favor of third parties." Crocker v.
Barro1i (Mo., 1921), 234 S. W. 1032.
This statement has been generally held to express the 1aw. 14 MICH.
L .. REV. 264.i WII.LIS'l'ON, CoN'l'RActs,_§ 998; WII.r.1s'l'oN, SAI.ES, § 244; Talley
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v. Beever and Hi11des, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 675; Carter v. Harden, 78 Me. S28;
Smith v. Williams, II7 Ga. 782; Hood v. Warreti (Ala., 1921), 87 So. 524
However, some courts express a willingness to abandon the older view
where the subvendee sues on a warranty of food. In Chysky v. Drake Bras.
Co., 182 N. Y. S. 459,_ where the plaintiff sued for injuries resulting from
a mouth infection caused by a wire contained in a cake of the defendant's
manufacture which the plaintiff had purchased through a retailer, the court
said: "* * * I am of the opinion that the implied warranty of the defendant
of the fitness of the cake for human consumption extended to the ultimate
consumer of the cake * * * and that the implied warranty inured to the
benefit and protection of the p1aintiff, although there was no direct contractual relation between the plaintiff and the manufacturer of the cake."
Statements to the same effect are found in the following: Tomlinson v.
Armour, 75 N. J. L. 748 (diseased meat); Parks v. C. C. Yost Pie Co., 93
Kan. 334 (decayed pie); Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52 (trichinae in
meat); Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N. C. 33 (decayed mullets); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co. (Ia., 1920), 176 N. W. 382 (diseased
meat-in baked beans). But when we analyze these cases we find only
Catani v. Swift & Co., supra, holding that the implied warranty makes the
manufacturer absolutely liable without regard to negligence. Even in that
case the court relies on cases decided upon tort 1iability. In all the other
cases above cited the element of negligence was possibly present, so that
we cannot say the courts' decisions were not influenced thereby. In effect,
then, these cases may go no further than the negligence doctrine of Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, where the manufacturer was held liable to the
third party consumer. See also... 18 MICH. L. fuv. 436. Public policy, however, may justify the extension of the manufacturer's liability upon the
implied warranty in food cases.
'.I'R:rAL-INSTRUC'l'ION ON A LoWER DEGREE OF CRIME WHEN THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE THEREOF IS fuvtRSIBI.E ERRoR.-The defendant was indicted for
murder and was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. The defendant
moved for a new trial on the ground that it was error for the court to
submit the issue of involuntary manslaughter when there was no evidence
whatever to indicate that the killing was unintentional. Held, reversible
error. State v. Pruett (N. M., 1921), 203 Pac. 840.

Whether or not an instruction on a lower degree of crime, when there
is no evidence thereof, is reversible error is in conflict. The majority of cases
hold that such an instruction is reversible error. Jorda1i 'v. State, II7 Ga.
405; Diche11s v. Peaple, 67 Colo. 409; People v. Hmitfagton, I38 Cal. z6I.
The theory upon which these cases proceed is that an instruction should be
based upon the evidence. Otherwise there would be the anomaly of a man
convicted and punished for an offense which the evidence totally fails to
show was ever committed by him. The minority of courts, however, hold
that such an instruction is one of which the defendant cannot complain.
State v. Quick, 150 N. C. 820; Bemiett v. State, 95 A~k. 100. In the last
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case cited the court said "the defendant cannot complain of instructions that
allowed the jury to find him; guilty of a lower degree of homicide than he
was really guilty of under the evidence, if guilty at all." It would seem
that the rule which confines the instruction strictly to the evidence is the
better, for an instruction in regard to a lower degree of crime, when not
warranted by the evidence, would operate as an inducement to sentimental
jurors to convict of one of those grades when they should convict the accused
of the higher or acquit him altogether.
TRUSTS-GRAIN COMPANY HELD TRUST~ OF PROCEJWS FROM SALE OF
MORTGAGED GRAIN DELIVERED TO IT.-Grain was delivered to D, a grain company, by one who had previously mortgaged it to P. P notified D of its
mortgage and directed it not to sell the grain nor pay the mortgagor for it.
But D later sold the grain, retaining the proceeds of the sale. The mortgagor later became bankrupt and the referee in bankruptcy obtained a court
order requiring D to pay over to him these funds as the property of the
mortgagor. In a suit by P it was held that D had become a trustee of the
funds £of P and as such was liable to .,P for the loss, for if it had disclosed
the fact that it was a trustee it would have defeated the attachment by the
referee in bankruptcy. Bank of Brookings v. Aun1ra Grain Co. et al. (S.
D., 1922), 186 N. W. 563.
In a prior hearing in the same court, 43 S. D. 591, 181 N. W. 909, it
had been held that the grain company was a gratuitous bailee, not a trustee,
and consequently not liable because it could not question the legality of the
process by which the grain was taken from it. The basis of this holding
was that the mortgagee had consented to the sale by the grain company, so
the latter had done nothing wrongful. There was consequently nothing on
which, to base an involuntary trusteeship. Two justices dissented, and on
the rehearing, here noted, their opinion was adopted by the majority of
the court as being 'in all things correct." This opinion seems to be
based on the premise that the sale by the grain company was not with the
consent of the mortgagee. If the sale was made in violation of the mortgagee's rights it was a conversion;_ if in recoguition of them, the grain
company voluntarily became a trustee of the proceeds for the mortgagee.
It would, perhaps, have been clearer simply to call it a case of constructive
trust based on conversion. See BOGERT, TRusTS, § 37. The holding seems
sound, although trust principles are .applied to a somewhat unusual case.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-FURNISHING MEANS TO Rm'AILER.-Complainant
made a liquid preparation of quinine with the bitter taste disguised, and
colored and flavored by chocolate. Through salesmen it was submitted to
physicians, who came to prescribe it and their prescriptions were filled by
pharmacists to whom it was sold by the complainant. Later the defendant
began to make the same preparation, as it had the right to do, and though
it did not sell the preparation as the complainant's it carefully selected a
chocolate which gave it the same flavor and color. By representing that it
could be used in filling prescriptions for the complainant's "coco-quinine"
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and by selling it at a lower price, it induced pharmacists to buy and use it
for that purpose. Held, that by such conduct the defendant made itself a
party to the deception of the ultimate purchaser, and was chargeable with
unfair competition, and that to prevent such deception it should be enj oine:l
from using chocolate-in its preparation. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Wm. R. TVarner
& Co., 275 Fed. 752.
The unfair competition is in the deceit of the ultimate purchaser. It is
no defense that the retailer is not deceived. Lever v. Goodwin [1887], 36
Ch. Div. 1; George G. Fox Co. v. Gly1111, 191 Mass. 344 9 L. R. A. (n. s.)
1096. See also Federal Trade Commissio1t v. Winsted Hosiery Co., cited
in the following note. The precise question presented by the principal case
is whether injunctive relief may be had against the manufacturer when
the actuaf fraud is committed by the retailer. That this relief may not be
had when he ,is unconnected with the fraud except for supplying the instrument with which it was committed was accepted in the case of Hostet~er v.
Fries, 17 Fed. 620, and in Royal Co. v. Royal, 122 Fed. 337, it was suggested,
but not decided, that if tricky retailers, knowing better, represent the defendant's articles as the goods of the complainant, it is probably not a matter
for which the defendant is responsible. The court in the principal case was
careful to state that the question was not whether the defendant was responsible for the fraud of the retailers, but whether, in counseling fraud and
supplying an innocent means, it was itself guilty of fraud. Some courts
have held that it is enough to show that the defendant made it possible for
the retailer to sell the goods in such a way as to deceive the ultimate purchaser. New England Awl & Needle Co. v. Marlborough Awl & Needle
Co., 168 Mass. 154 For a collection of cases, see note to George G. Fox Co.
v. Glynn, 9 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1096. The court's statement of the question in
the principal case is due to the fact that federal courts adhere to. the rule
that a fraudulent intent is necessary in a case of unfair competition, and
must be proved in order to claim the intervention of a court of equity.
Hires v. Villepuge, 1g6 Fed. 890; Elgin Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179
U. S. 665, 674 A contrary view prevails in England and a number of the
state courts. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wilso1i [1877], 3 App. Cas. 376; Wirtz/v.
Eagle Bottling Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 164 In accord with the principal case,
holding that relief will be granted against the manufacturer if shown that
his purpose in selling the retailer was to defraud the public, are Coco Cola
Co. v. Gay Ola Co-., 200 Fed. 720 (beverage) ; Royal Co. v. Royal, supra
(name); Lever v. Goodwin, supra (wrapper).
UNFAIR CoMPE'!'l'.l'ION-PRO'.l'ECTION oF THE PUBr.1c.-Defendant sold to
retailers underwear branded as "gray wool," "natural wool," and the like.
Much of it contained, in fact, only a: small percentage of wool. The Federal
Trade Commission ordered defendant to cease using so deceptive brands.
Held, the order was within· the power of the Commission and v·alid. Fed.
Trade Com. v. Winsted Hosiery Cc. (U. S. Sup. Ct., April 24, 1922).
The defense was that only the public were deceived ; that retailers knew
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the brands to be inaccurate; that there was, therefore, no unfair competition
and the Col!llllission had no power to act. The early part of the Supreme
Court's opinion suggests that the interest of the public might be sufficient
basis for the order, but its validity is eventually predicated on the fact that
by deceiving the public the defendant was in effect unfairly competing with
other manufacturers. For comment on the decision in the court below as
to the scope of the Commission's powers, see 20 MICH. L. REY. 122, 781,
wherein the contrary decision of the lower court is adversely commented on.
Wn.Ls-CoNS'tRUC'tION-IF Two Cr,Aus:iis AR:ii R.:iiPUGNANT, LAT:tiR CLAus:ii

CoN'tROI.S.-Testator gave to his wife all his property to hold in trust for
their granddaughter and adopted daughter, Margaret. Upon the death of
his wife all the property remaining he gave to Margaret for her sole use
;md benefit. Finally, he named two persons guardians and administrators
until Margaret should be hventy-one. It was adjudged below that these
provisions were repugnant, that the later should prevail over the earlier, and
that therefore the effect was to give the wife a- life interest, with remainder
over to Margaret. Held, that all could be reconciled, and that the property
was given in trust for Margaret, the wife taking nothing. Martiii v. Palmer
(Ky., 1921), 234 S. W. 742.
It should be taken as a legal axiom that intent is the pole star in the
construction of wills. Citations are not needed to the principles that this
intent is to be gathered from the will as a whole, endeavoring, if possible,
to give full effect to every part. If one construction will, while another will
not, do this, the former is to be preferred, if possible. Usually, as in the
principal case, the court is able to find a possible construction that does this,
and there is no need to decide which of two clauses is to prevail. Often a
later clause modifies or cuts down an earlier. Grein-er v. Heins (Ind. App.,
1921), 131 N. E. 20, in which this was not the case because the later clause
was not clear. Sometimes the court resorts to implications to_ overcome .
apparent conflict. Porter v. Union Trust Company, 182 Ind. 637. This case,
like the principal case, follows the usual statement that if two clauses of a
will cannot be reconciled, and are equally specific, the later ·controls. This
is sometimes put on the ground that we deal with a man's last will, and
the latest clauses therefore control. But this is merely specious, for the
whole will must be regarded ·as at one moment, viz., at the moment of its
execution, the will of the testator, and no part is later in his intent than
· any other. The mere arrangement of the various paragraphs has no such
significance as is often supposed. Indeed,' in some jurisdictions the rule is
-stated to be that if different provisions are so repugnant that both cannot
stand the first must prevail. Hiller v. Herrick (Ia., 1920), 179 N. vV. n3.
Whichever rule be adopted in the few cases in which reconciliation is not
possible, it is a mere rule of convenience, .and is not to be applied if from
the whole will and the surrounding circumstances it appears that it would
defeat the intention of the testator. That intent is .to be gathered from
the whole will. Davis v. Kendall (Va., 1921), 107 S. E. 751.
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WILI.s-REvoc.A'.l.'ION BY MARRI.AGS-S'.l.'.A'.l.'U'.l.'S CoNS'.l.'RUSD.-The testator; a
bachelor at the time of making his will, provided generaly in it that if he
should marry, the person who should be his wife at the time of his death
was to ·receive certain devises. Later he married and his wife survived him.
By statute it was provided that marriage was a revocation of a prior will.
Held (two justices dissenting), that the testator's subsequent marriage
revoked the will under the terms of the statute. Gillma1m v. Dressler et al.
(Ill., 1921); 133 N. E. 186.
Under many sta~utes it has been held that marriage per se works a revocation of the will. Hiuinall v. Ham, 183 Ill. 486; Ingersoll v. Hop kins, 170
Mass. 401; M cA111111lty v. M cAmmlty, 120 Ill. 26; Stewart v. Miil!tolla11d, 88
Ky. 38. And under such a statute as 1 Viet. in England it has been decided
that a will is revoked even if made in contemplation of marriage and containing clauses by which provision is made for a wife in case of test!ator's
death. Francis v. Marsh, 54 W. Va. 545; In re Larsen, 18 S. D. 335. Wills
made in contemplation. of marriage are, however, sometimes expressly
excepted from the operation of the statute, especially if the fact appears on
the face of the will. Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732; Ingersoll v. Hopkins, supra.
If the statute contains no such qualification, however, the court must hold
that marriage is a revocation of a prior will. But the situation in Illinois is
pecu~iar. The Statute of Wills provides for revocation by certain methods,
and revocation by marriage is not included as one of the methods. But the
Statute of Descent contains a section which ends with the statement that
marriage shall be deemed a revocation of a prior will. These two statutes
were considered in Ford v. Greenawalt, 292 Ill. 121, on which the dissenting
justices rely in the principal·case, and the statute was interpreted as meaning
that a subsequent marriage should not be treated as a revocation of a will
if the will showed a contrary intention and made provision for the changed
.:09dition. The majority opinion in the principal case recognized this rule,
but stated that it did not apply to the facts of the principal case, where the
devise was made to an uncertain and unidentified person if she should be
testator's wife at the time of his death, while in Ford v. Greenawalt, s1epra,
the provision was for a certain and identified person, if testator married her.
This seems to be a very narrow distinction, and it is submitted that if the
above rule of construction is applied in a case like Fora v. Greenawalt, siipra,
it should be applied in the principal case, because here also the testator plainly
showed the intention that the instrument should continue to be his will by
providing for the new relation.
•'

